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COMMENT

AS TIME GOES BY: THE EFFECT

OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE PASSAGE OF
TIME ON THE ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS
ACTIVITY DOCTRINE
T&E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp.,
587 A.2d 1249 (N.J. 1991).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in T&E Indus. v.
Safety Light Corp. ("T&E If")' is one with great implications for the
past, present and future of toxic tort litigation. In T&E II, New
Jersey's high court, known for its environmental consciousness, 2 has
expanded the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to hold a distant
predecessor in title liable for such activities.3 This Comment reveals
and discusses several of the problems and unclear aspects of this
decision, as well as the significance of this holding for subsequent
toxic tort cases.4

1. 587 A.2d 1249 (NJ. 1991) [hereinafter T&E II].
2. See, e.g., In re Kimber Petroleum Corp., 539 A.2d 1181 (NJ. 1988) (finding that
any party even remotely responsible for pollution is a "responsible" party under New Jersey
law); Ayers v. Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (NJ. 1987) (holding that residents exposed to pollutants are entitled to medical screening costs resulting from such exposure); Department of
Envtl. Protection v. Ventron, 468 A.2d 150 (NJ. 1983) (applying a NJ. statute retroactively
in order to hold past, as well as present polluters liable). It should be noted that in Ventron,
there was no timing problem because the activity was carried on until the time of the trial.
3. T&E II, 587 A.2d at 1251.
4. The T&E II decision is noteworthy in a few respects which will not be the primary
focus of this comment. In T&E II, the court held that caveat emptor will act as a bar to
plaintiff's action when the plaintiff lacks knowledge of the danger and the claim is based on
an abnormally dangerous activity theory. 1d at 1256-58. The court distinguished Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985)
(nuisance cause of action could not be brought against a successor corporation). The New
Jersey court based the distinction on the fact that Philadelphia Electric was based on a
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Following a brief description of the background of the case, this
Comment focuses on how the long time-gap between defendant's act
and the corresponding injury influences the determination of whether
defendant's activity is "abnormally dangerous," as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement"). Further, the implications
involved with choosing particular points in time to assess liability will
also be discussed.
The second principal topic of this Comment focuses on a more
complex issue: whether knowledge or foreseeability should be included as an element in a strict liability cause of action for abnormally
dangerous activity. This section evaluates how a strict liability claim
is altered when a timing problem is introduced by the facts of the
case. For purposes of this Comment, a "timing problem" is defined
as: a situation which arises when legal doctrines designed to assess
liability for contemporaneous events are applied to cases where there
is a long latency period between defendant's activity and plaintiff's
realization of the resulting injury.5 In order to determine how this
issue might be resolved, it will be helpful to look to strict products
liability cases, many of which have a "timing problem" analogous to
that in T&E II. In addition, it is necessary to examine New Jersey
precedent, to discover if there might be a particular inclination this
court to include or exclude such an element in abnormally dangerous
activity cases.
Several optimal solutions to these issues arise from the policy

nuisance theory, not an abnormally dangerous activity theory, which the New Jersey courts
used expansively and supported vigorously. T&E I1, 587 A.2d at 1256-59 (stating that policy
reasons for adopting abnormally dangerous activity doctrine outweigh possible erosion of
caveat emptor). For an opposing view, see Albert G. Besser, Caveat Emptor-Where Have You
Gone?, 4 HOFSTRA PROP. LJ. 203 (1992).
A second and related issue was that a predecessor in title could collect on an abnormally dangerous activity theory. Previously, only adjacent landowners had been compensated

by use of the theory, although it had been urged by some that compensation should be
extended beyond neighboring property owners. See generally Jon G. Anderson, Comment, The
Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America: Abnormally Dangerous, Ultrahazardousor Absolute
Nuisance?, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L. 99, 105 (1978). But see Besser, supra at 211 (subsequent
purchaser unlike adjacent landowner can test property before buying so this is an expansion
of the previous doctrine which only allowed neighbors to collect because their injury was
completely involuntary).
5. One of the major areas where the timing problem has previously arisen is in strict
liability cases for failure to warn and defective design. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (NJ. 1982); Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743
(Tex. 1980), rev'g 585 S.W.2d 805 (1979). See generally John W. Wade, On the Effect in
Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734
(1983) (detailing the development of product liability law in relation to the timing problem).
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reasons behind the Restatement sections 519 and 520, and the plain
language of these sections. First, since section 520 of the Restatement
focuses on the defendant's activity, courts should evaluate whether the
activity was abnormally dangerous from the perspective existing at the
time when defendant chose to engage in it. If the time of activity
perspective is used, then the defendant is not required to possess
limitless foresight Second, foreseeability should be an element in an
abnormally dangerous activity case with a timing problem so that
strict liability does not become absolute liability. In order to promote
environmental policies while maintaining fairness to the defendant,
courts should place the burden of proving foreseeability on the party
with the best access to the information, the defendant.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
In T&E I, the plaintiff, T&E Industries, sued defendant, Safety
Light Corporation (as a successor corporation of United States Radium Corporation ("USRC")) in order to collect indemnification for
cleanup costs to land once owned by USRC, but presently owned by
T&E.6 USRC processed radium at the site in question, between 1917
and 1926 for manufacturing purposes, and during these years disposed
of the unprocessed radium tailings in a vacant portion of the lot.7
USRC rented the land to tenants during the 1930s and then sold it to
Arpin in 1943, who, unaware of the danger of the tailings, expanded
its plant to cover the portion of the lot where the tailings had been
disposed of.8 Since 1943, the property has been sold several times,
but at the time of litigation, it was owned by T&E.9 Over the decades, scientific knowledge of the dangers presented by radium tailings has continually increased.'" Today, the dangers are so widely
recognized that T&E is mandated by both federal and state statute to
clean up the land." Correspondingly, T&E seeks to have these costs

-

6. T&E II, 587 A.2d at 1262.
7. Id. (explaining that only 80% of the radium processed could be extracted from the

ore, the remainder or "tailings" were disposed of on a vacant portion of the property).
8. Id. at 1252-53.
9. Id. at 1253.
10. The amount of knowledge about the dangers of radium available at different points
in time will be detailed in the section which discusses whether knowledge should be a factor
in a strict liability case. See infra notes 78-80 and surrounding text.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8) (1988) (declaring site on a priority list for cleanup
because of toxic danger posed); Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act ('ECRA"),
NJ. REV. STAT. § 13:1K-6 (1983) (requiring that property in this condition not be sold until
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reimbursed by the party that created the hazardous condition on its
property. The New Jersey Supreme Court held defendant liable for
the results of the abnormally dangerous activity and therefore responsible for the cleanup costs.
In order to comprehend the distinction between this and other

abnormally dangerous activity cases, a brief background of the
doctrine's development is necessary. The "abnormally dangerous"
activity doctrine evolved from the landmark case, Rylands v. Fletcher." In Rylands, the defendant was held strictly liable for damages
which were incurred when water from defendant's reservoir broke
through an abandoned mine shaft and flooded plaintiff's land.13 The

court stated that strict liability was only to be applied when
defendant's use of the land was "non-natural" (as opposed to an
ordinary or common use of the land).14 The emphasis was placed on
the abnormal and inappropriate character of the defendant's activity,
in that case, keeping a reservoir in coal mining country. 5 As the
Rylands rule developed, the term "non-natural" was replaced by the
current term "abnormally dangerous," which was more clearly defined.' 6 Today, most jurisdictions have adopted strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activity in some form.17 In 1976, sections 519
and 520 of the Restatement were drafted, codifying the rule and expanding the list of factors to be used in determining which activities
are abnormally dangerous.'"

it is cleaned up).
12. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L- 1868).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 338.
15. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL, PROSSER AND KEEON ON TiE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at
545-46 (5th ed. 1984).
16. Over the decades, the general rule which has developed is that defendant is strictly
liable for abnormally dangerous activity when his activity is "unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the place where it is maintained in light of the character of that place and its
surroundings." Id. at 547-48.
17. Id. at 549.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976) reads as follows:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although
he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976) states that in determining whether an
activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk or some harm to the person, land or chattels
of others;
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The abnormally dangerous activity doctrine has been utilized to
hold defendants strictly liable for a variety of activities including:
blasting and storage of explosives, 9 escape of water,2" pollution of
a well, 21 crop dusting.' fireworks displays, gasoline transportation and storage,2 4 pile driving,' rockets,26 and disposal or escape
of various waste products.2 7 Even though the abnormally dangerous
activity doctrine has been applied to an extremely broad variety of
topics, in all these cases, the harmful activity and the corresponding
injury occurred either simultaneously or virtually simultaneously.
However, what makes the T&E H case so important is that it is the
first abnormally dangerous activity case to encounter a timing problem, 2 8 since the activity occurred between 1917 and 1926 and the
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
19. Harper v. Regency Dev. Co., 399 So. 2d 248 (Ala. 1981); Lobozzo v. Adam
Eidemiller, Inc., 263 A.2d 432 (Pa. 1970).
20. Albig v. Municipal Auth., 502 A.2d 658 (Pa. Super. CL 1985).
21. Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138 (Md. 1969); Branch v. Western Petroleum,
Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982).
22. Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829 (Okla. 1961).
23. Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917 (Wash. 1991), modified, 817 P.2d 1359
(Wash. 1991).
24. Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983
(1973).
25. Davis v. L&W Constr. Co., 176 N.W.2d 223 (Iowa 1970); Vein J. Oja & Assoc. v.
Washington Park Towers, Inc., 569 P.2d 1141 (Wash. 1977).
26. Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion, Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Cal. CL App. 1967); Berg v.
Reaction Motors Div., 181 A.2d 487 (NJ. 1962).
27. Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1975).
28. In addition to all the aforementioned cases, prior to T&E 11, no cases had been
even brought on an abnormally dangerous activity theory in an intermediate or high state
court where a party had attempted to apply the Restatement factors to a case with a timing
problem. See Ex parte Lipscomb, 414 So. 2d 86 (Ala. 1982) (storage of nitroglycerin);
Matoinco Oil Co., Inc., v. Arctic Mechanical, Inc., 796 P.2d 1336 (Alaska 1990) (explosion);
Dye v. Burdick, 553 S.W.2d 833 (Ark. 1977) (bursting dam); Ahrens v. Superior Court, 243
Cal. Rptr. 420 (Cal. CL App. 1988) (explosion); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758 (D.C.
1989) (sale of guns); Great Lakes Dredging & Dock Co. v. Sea Gull Operating Corp., 460
So. 2d 510 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1984) (noisy rock crushing machine); Bunyak v. Clyde J.
Yancey & Sons Dairy, Inc., 438 So. 2d 91 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1983) (overflowing manure);
Fallon v. Indian Trail Sch., 500 N.E.2d 101 (IIl. App. CL 1986) (trampoline); Erbrich Prod.
Co. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850 (Ind. CL App. 1987) (manufacture of chlorine bleach); Williams v. Amoco Prod. Co., 734 P.2d 1113 (Kan. 1987) (drilling of natural gas); John T.
Arnold Assoc. v. City of Wichita, 615 P.2d 814 (Kan. CL App. 1980) (bursting water main);
Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (manufacture of guns); Mahowald v.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 5
[Vol. 21:205

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

injury plaintiff is seeking redress for occurred decades later.
II.

STRICT LIABILITY IN AN ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS
CASE WrTH A TIMING PROBLEM

AcrvrrY

The imposition of strict liability in an abnormally dangerous
activity case, where a great deal of time has passed between the
activity and the injury, has both benefits and disadvantages. An argument for imposing strict liability is that the imposition of strict liability makes it more likely that the individual or corporation who has
damaged the land will be the party to clean it up. In an era where
our environmental consciousness has been raised and the desire to
restore land to a safe and usable condition has grown, it is certainly

Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1984) (explosion); Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.,
698 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. CL App. 1985) (radioactive emissions still being carried on); Matkovic
v. Shell Oil Co., 707 P.2d 2 (Mont 1985) (servicing hydrogen sulfide truck); Bagley v.
Controlled Env't Corp., 503 A.2d 823 (N.H. 1986) (contamination of ground soil by release
of chemicals); Ligocky v. Wilcox, 620 P.2d 1300 (N.M. CL App. 1980) (crop dusting);
Gutierrez v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc. 607 P.2d 622 (N.M. CL App. 1979) (flooding);
Rodgers v. City of Loving, 573 P.2d 240 (N.M. CL App. 1977) (fire); Mikula v. Duliba, 464
N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (hunting); Wirth v. Mayrath Indus., Inc. 278 N.W.2d
789 (N.D. 1979) (electric lines); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, 704 P.2d 118 (Or. 1985) (manufacture of guns); Melso v. Sun Pipe Line Co., 576 A.2d 999 (Pa. Super. CL 1990) (gas
spill); Smithbower v. Southwest Cent. Rural Elec. Coop., 542 A.2d 140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(electric lines); Painter v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 534 A.2d 110 (Pa. Super. CL 1987)
(pavement breaker); Robertson v. Grogan Inv. Co., 710 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)
(sale of guns); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977) (crop dusting);
Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Port of Seattle, 491 P.2d 1037 (Wash. 1971) (bursting water
main); Hernandez v. George E. Failing Co., 624 P.2d 749 (Wash. CL App. 1981) (power
lines); Penesehi v. National Steel Corp., 295 S.E.2d I (W. Va. 1982) (explosion).
Subsequent to the T&E 1Hcase, there have been a few interesting developments. Two
cases have rejected the holding in T&E 1Hto some extent. In Futura Realty v. Lone Star
Bldg. Ctr., 578 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1991), the court declined to extend the
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to cover a successor in title, holding that the doctrine
of caveat emptor prohibited this (subsequent purchaser suing previous owner for pollution on
purchased land). In Barras v. Monsanto Co., 831 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. CL App. 1992), the court
declined to recognize strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity as a cause of action
and chose not to apply the Restatement (new homebuyers suing homebuilder and manufacturer
for dumping toxic waste on property nearby the homesites). In Russell-Stanley v. Plant
Indus., 595 A.2d 534 (NJ. Super. CL Ch. Div. 1991), an intermediate New Jersey court cited
T&E II as presenting a portion of controlling law in its principles that the Restatement can
be applied to cases which are beyond the ordinary scope of the abnormally dangerous
doctrine and that caveat emptor is not a defense to an abnormally dangerous activity claim
(subsequent tenants sued landlord under abnormally dangerous activity theory for leaking
toxins). Other cases brought in intermediate and high state courts after T&E I are typical
abnormally dangerous activity cases involving explosions, blasting, fireworks, fumigation,
working with high voltage power lines, flooding et. al., none of which encounter the timing
problem presented by T&E 11.
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arguable that whomever has caused an injury by engaging in a -hazardous activity should rectify the damage, without regard to when it
occurred. Utilizing strict liability makes it easier to bring the responsible party to justice. One of the goals of strict liability is to focus on
the danger of the activity rather than the defendant's knowledge of
29
the fault or the reasonableness attributable to defendant's conduct.

Absent strict liability, it is more likely that a party who did not cause
the dangerous condition30 will be left with the cleanup costs (i.e., here
the current landowner).
On the other hand, there are some problems with the imposition
of strict liability where a timing problem exists, particularly when it
involves radioactive materials, as does the T&E II case. The court in
T&E II held that the disposal of radium was abnormally dangerous,
yet it seems unclear by what criteria this was determined. The court
failed to indicate what level of radioactivity was necessary in order to
find that disposal of a radioactive substance is an abnormally dangerous activity. Perhaps this is evaluated according to government standards, but such standards may not exist. Even in this case, "safe"

29. See generally KEETON ET AL, supra note 15, § 75. Some basic policy justifications
for strict liability are that the defendant is choosing to engage in an activity that is so
dangerous and he is exposing the public to such a great risk that it is fair to hold him liable
for any resulting harm (this seems to imply an element of foreseeability because the fairness
in imposing liability is because defendant was aware of the danger of the activity and chose
to expose the public to its risks anyway). The rationale for this is that the defendant is in
the best position to internalize costs associated with the risks posed and is also the party
most able to bear those costs. Another rationale for imposing strict liability is that defendant
weighed the cost of engaging in the activity versus the cost of possible litigation and defendant can only weigh the possible costs of foreseeable litigation. See infra Part V for more
discussion on foreseeability as an element of strict liability.
30. Under the federal Superfund statute, hazardeus sites are cleaned up by the federal
government and then an individual or corporation, typically the property owner, is billed for
the cleanup costs. In the T&E 11 case, the land was cleaned up under this statute, T&E was
billed for the costs and then sought and received indemnification from Safety Light for the
cleanup costs it had paid.
One problem which does not exist here but has arisen in Superfund or CERCLA
cases is that lending institutions who played no role in creating dangers risked being forced
to pay cleanup costs after they took over title to mortgaged land. Because the lender was
then the legal titleholder, it might be obligated under the statute to pay cleanup costs if it
participated in the day to day management of the property either before or after the business
ceased operations and sought bankruptcy protection. Here, liability is only imposed on the
party who created the abnormal danger and causation must be proven. See United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), afd, 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir.
1990); see also Murray Drabkin et al.,
Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste:
Caveat Creditor, 15 ENvTL. L. REP. 10168 (1985) (describing generally the problems created
for creditors by CERCLA legislation).
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levels of radium were not determined by the federal government until
1978,31 so what level would suffice had the case been brought before that date? Perhaps the government standards are merely minimum
statutory standards which need to be met.32 There has been no indication or suggestion of whether a defendant would be strictly liable
if an extremely low level of a highly dangerous radioactive substance
were found on land once owned and used by him. Thus, it remains
open to question whether a defendant would be held responsible
regardless of how negligible the level of material might be.
The courts need to establish a formula for determining when
cleanup is so vital as to mandate strict liability, and at what point
this liability is cut off.33 Radioactive materials present some other
problems because the half-life periods can be so long.' The responsible party could be long extinct by the time the suit is brought, leaving a plaintiff with contaminated land and no recourse. It is also
uncertain from the disposition of the T&E IH case whether a defendant is responsible for his actions indefinitely (until the land is
cleaned up) or whether his liability ceases at some point in time. The
Appellate Court's characterization of the disposal of radium as a
"continuing tort"35 indicates that liability might last indefinitely.36
These are issues which will arise in any case dealing with removal of
a radioactive substance. To the credit of the New Jersey Supreme
31. T&E 11, 587 A.2d at 1253 (discussing generally federal policy on radiation levels);
see also T&E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp. 546 A.2d 570, 573 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988) ( 'T&E I") (discussing some of the state standards for radon).
32. The state and federal standards might simply be minimal standards. In negligence
cases, for example, compliance with a statute is not per se non-negligence; it only proves
that the defendant met some minimal requirements imposed by law but does not necessarily
preclude a finding that his failure to take additional precautions render him negligent. See
Keyes v. Amundson, 391 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1986); Stone v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 490
N.Y.S.2d 468 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
33. One way of doing this might be to measure the costs of the cleanup against the
severity of the danger and the probability of individuals being harmed by the substance.
34. T&E I, 546 A.2d at 571. (The ore used by USRC was made up of uranium,
radium and vandium. Uranium, which has a half-life of 4.5 billion years produces several byproducts during its decay, one of which is radium 226. Radium 226 has a half-life of 1,600
years and as it decays produces radon 222, which is a radioactive gas, with a half-life of 3.8
days. This radon produces ionized particles which attach onto surfaces and may cause cancer
when inhaled.).
35. Id. at 577.
36. It would be very interesting to see what the court would do with a radioactive
substance with a very short half-life, which would create a danger for several days, weeks or
months. Would the disposal of such a substance or its predecessor in the radioactive chain be
enough to impose strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity, even if the danger were
only for a short period of time and the paramount danger from such substance had passed?
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Court, it vowed to follow a case by case determination when deciding
which activities are abnormally dangerous.3 7 This method will allow
testimony concerning the levels and dangerous propensities of different materials before a defendant will be held liable.3"
The New Jersey Supreme Court purports to be following the
Restatement sections 519 and 520 in deciding to hold Safety Light
strictly liable for an abnormally dangerous activity, but several problems are evident from the court's dicta. Restatement section 519 imposes liability on a party who creates a harm as a result of an abnormally dangerous activity. 9 However, the court speaks almost interchangeably about abnormally dangerous activities, abnormally dangerous conditions, and abnormally dangerous substances.' If the
plain meaning of these terms is considered, it is obvious that they
refer to three distinct concepts which should be distinguished, rather
than lumped together. The abnormally dangerous activity in this case
is USRC's processing and disposal of radium onto the Orange Street
site. The abnormally dangerous condition is the unsafe level of radon
on the plaintiff's land, as a result of the defendant's abnormally dangerous activity. The abnormally dangerous substance is radium and its
by-products. The court spends a great deal of time talking about
abnormally dangerous conditions and substances and yet it is never
mentioned by what criteria the court is interpreting and assessing
these issues. The Restatement does not define these theories, it only
defines an abnormally dangerous activity. If the court is genuinely
following the Restatement, all that is relevant is whether defendant
engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity.
There are a few reasons why the court might have chosen to
inject these terms into the case. On the simplest level, this court
might only be stressing their prevailing belief that parties who engage
in toxic or hazardous waste dumping should pay for their actions.4 1

37. T&E 11, 587 A.2d at 1259.
38. The case by case approach is far better than the per se rule of the Appellate Court
which would impose liability in all cases. Deciding on a case by case basis allows for
testimony on the levels and dangers of different radioactive substances as well as testimony
about knowledge of foreseeability (if this is a factor).
39. Section 519 of the Restatement appears in its entirety in note 18, supra.
40. T&E II, 587 A.2d at 1258-61. (For example, the court discusses placing liability on
the party responsible for the hazardous condition; refers to the presence of an abnormally
dangerous condition; talks about radium as an abnormally dangerous substance;, and mentions
the hazardous nature of radium and concludes that defendant knew enough about the abnormally dangerous nature of the substance.).
41. See supra note 2.
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While there might be an issue as to whether defendant's activity was
abnormally dangerous,42 it is very clear from the facts that the resulting condition of the property was abnormally dangerous and that
radium is an abnormally dangerous substance, regardless of the criteria used."3 Perhaps the use of these terms was not a conscious attempt to change the doctrine, but merely a reflection of the court's
strong belief that defendant should pay because of the dangers it
created. Similarly, the use of these terms might have been the result
of a conscious choice on the part of the court to interpret the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine very broadly as New Jersey courts
had done in the past.' The incorporation of these concepts into the
doctrine would allow the doctrine to be more easily applied to cases
where radioactive materials are involved.
The most interesting possibility is that the use of these terms
may have reflected the court's recognition that a timing problem
existed in this case and that therefore terms in the current Restatement are inadequate to resolve some of the issues presented. The
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine has typically been applied
when the activity and the resulting harm are contemporaneous. Looking at this case in terms of the abnormally dangerous activity, the
activity was the processing and disposal of radium that took place
between 1917 and 1926. The fact that the activity took place in the
distant past while the Restatement section 520 seems to define an
activity in the present tense, raises the issue of how to apply the
Restatement factors in a situation they do not quite fit: the abnormally
dangerous activity case with the timing problem.4 On the other
hand, the concepts "abnormally dangerous condition" and "abnormally
dangerous substance" elude the timing problem because they existed
throughout the relevant time span: from the time of the activity
through the time of trial.' The abnormally dangerous activity ceased
42. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying texL
43. Whenever a court introduces new terms and concepts into an area of law, it should
be careful to define and explain such terms so that they are not misused in future decisions.
This courts failure to define these terms and how they should be used could result in
another court using them in a way which was not intended. Although the danger of radium
and the resulting condition on the property seem to be "abnormally dangerous" according to
the facts of this case, the terms and concepts should be clarified so as to make the court's

holding more explicit and serve as a guideline for future cases.
44. See T&E 1, 546 A.2d 570 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); Department of Envtl.
Protection v. Ventron, 468 A.2d 150 (NJ. 1983).
45. For a complete discussion of how the timing problem affects the Restatement § 520
factors, see infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
46. It is fascinating that the court chose the terms "condition" and "substance" which
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in 1926. If the activity has ceased, it is logical to determine whether
it was abnormally dangerous as of that date. If defendant ceased
engaging in the activity without knowing of the long term risks posed
by his prior act, he believes his exposure to liability has also ceased
because any potential risks posed by the activity are gone and he is
not making a conscious choice to expose the public to further danger.
By using the two new concepts, the court evades the timing problem
and creates an option of evaluating the danger of the "substance" and
the "condition" at any point along the time spectrum, up to and including the time of trial.47
IV. APPLICATION OF THE TIMING PROBLEM
TO THE RESTATEMENT SECTIONS 519 AND 520

Section 519 of the Restatement imposes strict liability on an
individual or business carrying on an abnormally dangerous activity
for "harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the
activity, although he has exercised utmost care to prevent the
harm."4 8 Since this section focuses on the "harm" resulting from the
activity, rather than the activity itself,49 the timing problem ° does
not affect the application of this section to an abnormally dangerous
have been previously used by courts in product liability cases with timing problems (i.e.
defective condition unreasonably dangerous; unreasonable dangerous substance). These terms
are far broader than "activity" and enable the court to find danger at virtually any point in
time. Conceivably, the use of these terms might indicate that the court recognized that the
timing problem in this case was analogous to the timing problem which existed in various
product liability cases. Purvis v. PPG Indus., Inc., 502 So. 2d 714 (Ala. 1987) (unreasonably
dangerous condition); Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387 (111.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988) (prescription drug can be unreasonably dangerous
substance in unreasonably dangerous condition if no warning); Skonberg v. Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp., 576 N.E.2d 28 (Il1. App. CL 1991) (asbestos in unreasonably dangerous
condition when no warning of compound effect of smoking on asbestos exposure); Rice v.
James Hanrahan & Sons, 482 N.E.2d 833 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (ureaformaldehyde is
hazardous substance). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. G
(defective condition), K (unavoidably unsafe products generally drugs, which would also be
considered substances) (1976).
47. See infra Part V for a full discussion of the time of trial and time of activity rules.
Generally, the "time of activity" rule would assess defendant's liability as it existed while the
activity was being carried on and the "time of trial" rule would determine his liability as of
the trial date.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976).

49. Section 520 of the Restatement unlike § 519, is affected by the timing problem
because it focuses not on the "harm" to the plaintiff but on the "activity" of the defendant.
While "harm" may by definition occur at a distant point in the future, "activity" only exists
so long as it is being carried on.
50. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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activity case. According to the plain meaning of section 519, if defendant caused the resulting harm, he may be held liable under this
section whether the harm occurred immediately after defendant engaged in the abnormally dangerous activity or at some time in the
future. In other words, because the Restatement is phrased broadly
and does not pinpoint a time at which "harm" is determined, this
section of the Restatement can still be applied regardless of the point
we choose on the time continuum to assess the "harm" caused by the

defendant's activity."
The application of Restatement section 520 in an abnormally
dangerous activity case with a timing problem raises a far more complex question than the application of section 519, and it is one which
is inadequately resolved in the T&E II decision. The court purports to
be determining that processing radium is an abnormally dangerous
activity according to the section 520 factors. 2 Yet, the court never
mentions how the lengthy time gap between the dangerous activity
and the resulting harm affects the Restatement factors. Further, the
court failed to make a decision on whether these factors are to be
determined as of the 1920s (the time of the activity) or as of the
1980s (the time of the trial). It will become clear as these factors are
discussed individually that the conclusion that an activity is or is not
abnormally dangerous depends on the point in time that the court
53
selects.

Factor A of section 520 is "the existence of a high degree of
risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others."' Factor

51. On the other hand, the issue of how to apply § 520 in such a case is problematic
because the determination whether the activity is abnormally dangerous might produce different results depending on the point that the court chooses to assess liability.
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976), stating that the factors to be
considered are:
(a) the existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d)extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e)inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f)extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes).
53. Even though this case might not be decided differently depending on what time is
chosen, the court should realize that this distinction might be more significant in future cases.
Since the problem was present here, the court should have made a ruling to promote consistent and equitable future decisions.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976) (emphasis added).
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B is the "likelihood that the harm that results from it [the activity]
will be great."55 Evaluation of these factors may yield different results depending on whether they are measuring the risk and likelihood
of harm against knowledge and standards which existed at the time of
the activity or against those that existed at the time of trial.' The
court will be more likely to affirn the presence of these factors if the
risks are evaluated at the time of trial, because it can apply all that
has been learned about the risks and probability of harm in the decades since the activity took place. Applying this hindsight approach
allows the court to more accurately calculate the risks and the severity of harm attributable to the activity. In addition, using the time of
trial rule has the benefit of simplicity, because no expert testimony is
needed as to the knowledge and standards which existed during the
time of the activity. On the other hand, if the time of trial rule is
used, defendant may be held liable for risks attributable to his activity
which were not known at the time when the choice to engage in the
activity was made. Perhaps, if defendant knew what is known today
about the risks and the possibility of harm presented by the processing and disposal of radium, he might have chosen to forsake the
activity or at the very least to take far greater safety precautions.
Thus, it seems unfair to use a hindsight approach if defendant had no
way to know or foresee the potential harm to which he was exposing
others, or the potential liability to which he was subjecting himself.
To promote fairness to the defendant, the court may choose to hold
him, strictly liable only for risks which were known or foreseeable to
him during the time he engaged in the activity. If factors A & B of
the Restatement are meant to deter activities when the risk and cost
of potential liability are too great, or if they are meant to force defendant into an analysis and balancing of the risks and benefits of the

55. Id (emphasis added).
56. Although radium is clearly equally dangerous regardless of a defendant's knowledge
of the danger, there are several reasons why a defendant's knowledge or foreseeability of
knowledge is relevant to a case such as this one. First, because of the long latency period, a
great deal of information has surfaced concerning the dangers of radium, which the defendant
may not have had access to at the time he chose to engage in the activity. It seems unfair
to impose strict liability on a defendant based on information gathered subsequent to the
activity, the existence of which the defendant did not know. Second, the Restatement possesses a fairness component in comment G, in that there must be "justification" for holding
defendant strictly liable. This shows that the Restatement does not take the imposition of
strict liability lightly and that the court should tread carefully when expanding this liability.
Using the knowledge of the risks at the time of the activity assures that strict liability is not
unnecessarily expanded and that the true purposes of this doctrine are given effect.
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activity, these purposes can only be effectuated by using the time of
activity rule. 7 Comment G of the Restatement, which elaborates on
the "risk of harm" in factors A & B, states that the risk presented by
defendant's activity must be "major in degree and sufficiently serious
in its potential consequences to justify holding defendant strictly liable
for subjecting others to an unusual risk."-s Defendant can only evaluate the seriousness of the risk according to the danger known at the
time of the activity. Unless the court uses the time of activity rule,
the court is weighing the risks and benefits of the activity on a different scale than that used by defendant; they are balancing with
information that the defendant was simply not privy to. In addition,
by using the term "recognizable risk" in comment G, the Restatement
indicates that defendant is only meant to be held liable for risks of
which he knows or could reasonably foresee. Hence, if the court
determines the existence and severity of the risk from the time of
trial perspective, it is edging closer to imposing absolute liability
rather than strict liability for those engaging in potentially hazardous
activities.
Factor C is the "inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of
reasonable care."59 Factor C might also be influenced by the timing
gap as it exists in T&E IL Again, as with factors A & B, the ability
or inability to eliminate risk is a much simpler issue to decide on a
hindsight basis, when there are decades of data presently existing on
the dangers of radium. The ability or inability to eliminate the risk
becomes clearer over the years as this data accumulates. However, if
what is relevant is defendant's ability to eliminate the risk, the appropriate time for the court to examine is the time of the activity. If
the risk cannot be eliminated at the time of the activity, then the
defendant, by engaging in the activity, is exposing himself to liability
regardless of whether it can be subsequently reduced. Any safety
advances made after defendant engaged in the activity would be irrelevant to defendant's liability, and therefore defendant would not be
able to claim that with contemporary technology he could "eliminate

57. If these provisions are meant to promote safety and provide true guidelines for

potential defendants as to what is abnormally dangerous, the court should use the time of the
activity. To do otherwise, renders the factors meaningless because defendants may not know
future risks and will therefore either forsake the activity even if it may be beneficial or they
will simply engage in the activity without regard to potential risks. The section then loses
any deterrent or balancing benefiL
58. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF ToRTS § 520 cmt. G (1976).
59. IdM§ 520.
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the risk" by using "reasonable care." 6° This is a common sense approach since what really matters is the safety of the activity at the
time it was carried on and not how safe it might be if carried on
today. In addition, the court needs to clarify precisely what "risk"
defendant is liable for: the risk of the activity of which defendant is
aware (those that are known or foreseeable) or all risks associated
with the activity (without regard to the knowledge or foreseeability of
the defendant).61 Realistically, only the former makes sense because
it seems ludicrous to hold a defendant responsible for failing to eliminate risks that were not known at the time of the activity. No amount
of "reasonable care" could eliminate risks which were not known or
knowable at the time of the activity.62 If, then, defendant is only responsible for eliminating the risks he knows of, this rule would support the contention that the time of activity rule should be used and
all subsequently discovered risks and safety advances disregarded.
Factor D is the "extent to which the activity is not a matter of
common usage."63 In applying factor D, the discrepancy presented
by the timing problem becomes more clear. The factor would probably be decided the same way, regardless of the timing problem, simply because of the facts presented by the T&E II case. The processing and disposal of radium was not a commonplace activity either in
the 1920s or the 1980s. However, were the facts slightly different,
there could clearly be a problem with this factor. It is fairly easy to
contemplate a situation where a manufacturing procedure or the storage of a chemical might be novel in the 1920s and therefore carried
on by relatively few people (not a matter of common usage) but in
the 1980s is a useful and profitable trade that has grown over the
past six decades (and is now clearly a matter of common usage). 64 It

60. Id.
61. Here, this factor of the Restatement introduces the question which will be discussed
in Part V, infra, whether knowledge and/or foreseeability should be a factor in determining
strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity with a timing problem. ,In fact, the court
might not even have to include the knowledge element per se, if it takes knowledge into
account when assessing the Restatement factors.
62. The words "reasonable care7 imply a "reasonable man" standard. A reasonable man
would only be able to eliminate the risks known at the time of the activity, therefore this
factor implies that the time of activity rule and the foreseeability element play a role in this
case. It is fair to hold defendant responsible for any risks which were reasonably foreseeable,
however the court should not expect the defendant to foresee risks in the very distant future
as if he had a crystal ball.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976) (emphasis added).
64. This scenario is analogous to that presented by many products liability cases; a
product is invented and at first is used by relatively few. As the years go by, the product

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:205

is just as easy to visualize the opposite scenario, where the activity is
a matter of common usage during the 1920s, but by the 1980s the
number of people engaged in the trade has dropped to almost
none.6" In terms of this factor, the time period selected by the court
could easily be determinative of the result and therefore the court
should select the pertinent time in order to avoid arbitrary and capricious results.
Factor E is the "inappropriateness of the activity to the place
where it is carried on."' The timing problem is also evident in examining factor E. The processing of radium on a plot of land would
most likely be unaffected by the timing problem. However, the inappropriateness of the radium disposal could be drastically affected by
the passage of time.67 A substance dumped in an uninhabited area in
the 1920s could wind up in a booming metropolis or urban center of
the 1980s as a result of population growth and changing demographics. Obviously, the dumping is far more inappropriate in the 1980s
urban setting. Since there has been population growth in much of the
nation over the past 60 years, the defendant is more likely to be held
liable if the time of trial rule is used, because the site of the activity
is more likely to be in an "inappropriate setting" by today's standards. Using the time of trial rule would mean assessing the danger
of defendant's activity to today's community rather than the community which existed at the time the activity occurred. This rule would
be unfair because a defendant could be held liable for "carrying on"
an activity in an area which may have been appropriate at the time
defendant acted, but became unsuitable at some future date due to

proves to be profitable and meets with a series of improvements in both design and safety
and correspondingly becomes a commonly produced product with far fewer dangers than
existed at its inception (e.g., automobiles, lawnmowers).
65. This can also be paralleled to the products area. One clear example would be the
DES market. In the 1950s and 1960s, DES was widely prescribed to prevent miscarriages.
Subsequently, it was discovered that it was ineffective and caused cancer in some of the
daughters of these patients. Thus, today, no DES is manufactured to prevent miscarriages.
An analogy can also be made to 'moving to the nuisance.- In these cases, a plaintiff
may be barred from suing a defendant who is engaged in an activity which is a nuisance if
plaintiff voluntarily chose to move to that location. McClung v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.
Co., 51 So. 2d 371 (Ala. 1951); Lea v. North Carolina Bd. of Transp., 304 S.E. 2d 164
(N.C. 1983). Just as what may have been considered a nuisance has been changed by the

actions of others, so too what may have once been a matter of common usage has been
altered by the actions of the surrounding community.
66.

REsTAT.IENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976).

67. It is unclear from the facts given in the T&E H case exactly what the surroundings
were at the time of the activity and how those surroundings have changed over the years.
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population growth and demographic changes which were both unforeseeable" to the defendant and beyond his control. Further, using the
time of trial rule presents an inconsistency in that a defendant would
be held liable for "carrying on" an activity long after his activity has
ceased, rather than being held accountable for his actions at the time
they actually took place. This factor strongly indicates that the time
of activity rule is the one that should be used because what is really
relevant is whether a defendant's activity was inappropriate to the surroundings at the time he chose to engage in it. The demographic
changes which take place after the activity has ceased evolve independently of the danger created by the defendant,69 and therefore should
not be considered in evaluating the inappropriateness of the surroundings. The time of trial rule extends strict liability too far by holding
the defendant responsible for environmental and demographic changes
occurring in the distant future.
Factor F is the "extent to which its value to the community is
outweighed by its dangerous attributes." 0 The interpretation of this
final factor may also be altered depending upon the perspective from
which it is examined. Although the other factors of section 520 have
some similarity to the products area, factor F has a direct parallel to
the products area. Factor F can be readily compared with the riskbenefit analysis employed by Restatement section 402A, which imposes strict liability for products." The identity of the community
which the court selects as being relevant to assessing this factor will
weigh heavily on the result. The court must decide whether this factor is referring to the community which existed at the time of the

68. While it is reasonable to hold a defendant liable for foreseeable dangers attributed
to his activity, the court should not expect that each individual who engages in a potentially
hazardous activity has studied demographic patterns and therefore has foresight into the
inappropriateness of his site to some future community.
69. In fact, the court could analogize this factor to the "moving to the nuisance" cases
and hold that a defendant is responsible for any damages which occurred to the surrounding
community at the time if his activity was -inappropriate" at that time, however, individuals
who moved to the surrounding community subsequent to the activity could be barred from
suing since they have voluntarily assumed certain risks by moving to a certain neighborhood.
See McClung, 51 So. 2d at 371.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976).
71. See Id § 402A. The risk-benefit test used in products cases, balances the utility of
the product against its risks, much like the balancing test in Factor F of § 520. However, if
§ 520 is examined as a whole, what § 520 actually consists of is a more clearly defined
risk-benefit analysis. What § 520 in its entirety does is lay out all the factors which would
indicate to the drafters that the risk of this activity outweighed itsbenefits and therefore the
defendant should be held strictly liable.
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defendant's processing and disposal, or the community existing at the
time of trial. The community existing at the time of the activity derived certain benefits from the defendant's processing. The radium
was used "primarily for medical purposes, but was also used on site
in a variety of commercial applications including the manufacture of
luminous paint."' Defining the community as that which existed at
the time of the activity provides the court with a method of balancing
the value to the community against the dangerous attributes. If, however, the community is defined as it exists today, there are currently
no benefits being derived from the activity, only danger created by
the activity. As the years passed, the value to the community decreased and the knowledge concerning the dangerous attributes of the
activity have increased; therefore, the balance weighs more and more
heavily in favor of finding an abnormally dangerous activity. When
the defendant chose to engage in the activity, his decision was based
on the benefits and dangers of the activity of which he was aware at
the time, and not according to what the future might bring. If the
court applies the time of trial rule here, as with the evaluation of
factors A and B, the court is measuring the defendant's behavior according to a different scale, a scale which the defendant did not have
the privilege of consulting. The defendant's choice was not made according to today's standards, but rather by those known years ago,
and it is by those standards that the court should balance the utility
and the danger of the conduct.7 3
V.

THE KNOWLEDGE OR F6RESEEABILITY ELEMENT

Another major problem with the holding in T&E H is that the
court did not resolve the critical issue of whether knowledge or foreseeability is an element in a strict liability cause of action for an
abnormally dangerous activity. Precisely, the issue is: Whether in
order to state a strict liability claim, a plaintiff must prove that defendant either: (1) had knowledge74 that certain risks or dangers were
72. T&E I, 546 A.2d 570, 571 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1988).
73. Defendant's choice to engage in the activity is made according to his assessment of
the Restatement factors at the time of the activity. If a defendant had the foresight of the
court, perhaps his assessment would be different. Defendant's conduct should not be judged
on a scale he had no access to. Defendant should be judged by what he in fact did, not by
what he would have done had he decided to engage in the activity today. Perhaps the most
convincing point is that using the time of trial rule would hold USRC to the same criteria as
a company that engaged in the same activity today, even though there have been many
changes in terms of risks and values.
74. Knowledge is defimed as, "acquaintance with fact or truth." BLACK's LAW DIcTIO-
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associated with his activity, or (2) that a defendant could foresee 75
that certain risks or dangers were attributable to his activity. The
court avoided the issue by stating, "[w]e need not... determine
whether knowledge is a requirement in the context of a strict-liability
claim based on an abnormally-dangerous activity [because] [e]ven if
the law imposes such a requirement, we are convinced... that defendant should have known about the risks of its activity."76 The
procedural history of the case indicates that, contrary to the court's
statement, there is a question of fact as to whether the defendant had
sufficient knowledge of the risks posed by radium. There is some
evidence that the defendant had some limited knowledge 7 of the
danger of radium during the time it was engaged in the activity."
However, most of the knowledge of radium's danger did not arise until the 1940s, or at least fourteen years after the defendant ceased the
production and disposal of radium at this site.7 9 Even though this

NARY 784 (5th ed. 1979).
75. Foresecability is defined as "the ability to see or know in advance; hence, the
reasonable anticipation that harm or injury is a likely result of acts or omissions. Id at 584;
see also supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing some of the policy justifications
for applying strict liability).
76. T&E II, 187 A.2d at 1260.
77. If knowledge of foresecability is an element, a question arises as to how much
knowledge a defendant must have had in order to satisfy the requirement (the substantive
standard) and what weight of evidence is needed to prove this element.
78. T&E II, 187 A.2d at 1252-53. When T&E began processing radium in 1917, an
employee, F. Hall, claimed she knew at the time that she should wear protective clothing
when working with radium and that she should not touch it. Another employee of USRC
wore protective clothing from 1923 to 1926. The court goes on to cite that some employees
who painted watches with luminous paint produced from radium eventually developed cancer
(emphasis added). The court does not specify when these cancers developed. Clearly, if the
cancers became apparent during the time of the production, this would indicate knowledge.
However, if they developed after production ceased, they would be of limited value in
assessing knowledge, particularly if the court evaluated the knowledge at the time of the
activity. See infra. The fact that warnings were posted seems to indicate that at least some of
the cancers developed during the time of production. Evidence which contradicts the contention that USRC was aware of the danger posed by disposal of radium tailings is that it was
common practice for industries at this time to dispose of radioactive by-products on property.
See Besser, supra note 4, at 223.
79. T&E 11, 187 A.2d at 1252-53. In 1932 and 1940, two articles were published
describing the dangers of inhaling radon gas. "In 1941, the U.S. Dept. of Commerce published a handbook (H-27) entitled 'Safe Handling of Radioactive Luminous Compound' which
contained information on the effects of inhalation of radon and providing safeguards which
could be undertaken." Id. In 1943, the president of USRC indicated in a letter that he had
some knowledge of the hazards of radioactive materials, he included therein some examples
of employees he believed to have died from exposure to radium. We should note here that
this knowledge did not accumulate until after USRC had ceased production and disposal of
radium at this site. See Besser, supra note 4, at 222-23 (industry may have had some
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knowledge did not exist until after production had ceased, the court
held that the defendant could still be held liable because the dangers
were foreseeable. In contrast, the jury at the trial level held that defendant was not negligent in its failure to warn with regard to the
1943 sale of the property.'e The jury's finding contradicts the court's
holding that the defendant had sufficient knowledge of the risk posed
by radium to be held liable. Rather, the jury found that the defendant
was not unreasonable in failing to warn of radium's dangers at the
time of the sale. Since radium is such a dangerous substance, the
most logical conclusion to be drawn from the jury's finding is that
the jury believed that the defendant possessed insufficient knowledge
of radium's dangers so that it would be unfair to require the defendant to warn the purchaser."' Based on the conclusion reached by
the jury, it is arguable that the knowledge question actually was presented by the facts of this case, and therefore the court should have
addressed the question of whether knowledge is a factor in a cause of
action for abnormally dangerous activity.
Clearly, the court in T&E II was aware of the ongoing debate as
to whether knowledge or foreseeability should be an element in an
abnormally dangerous activity case.' Some have argued that the
Restatement implies an element of foreseeability as a factor in strict
liability. 3 This argument is based on the wording of Restatement
section 519 which states that a defendant should be held liable because of the abnormal danger of the activity and the risk to which he
is exposing the public. According to this argument, if a defendant is

information on dangers of handling radium but there was no information or regulation of

tailings).
What we are talking about here is not a failure to warn in regards to the 1943 sale,
but an abnormally dangerous activity claim for the activity occurring between 1917 and 1926.
Thus, if knowledge is found to be a factor and the time of activity rule is used, this knowledge is not controlling but might only be introduced to support the contention that such
knowledge was foreseeable or scientifically knowable.
80. T&E 11, 187 A.2d at 1255.
81. Because radium is such a dangerous substance, a reasonable person would probably
be required to warn an unsuspecting purchaser of its dangers. Thus, since the jury held
defendant did not act unreasonably in failing to warn the purchaser, the logical conclusion is
that the jury believed defendant did not have the requisite knowledge which would require it
to warn the purchaser.
82. Id at 1255.
83. See, e.g., William R. Ginsberg & Lois Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic
Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 918 (1981); Robert W. James, Comment, Absolute Liability for UltrahazardousActivity: An Appraisal of the Restatement Doctrine, 37 CAL L. REV. 269, 272 (1949).
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unaware of the risk of his activity, he is not making a real choice to
expose the public to those risks because he could not properly evaluate them or take proper measures to reduce the potential for harm.
Therefore, those who advocate this position would claim that failure
to include a foreseeability element would expose a defendant to a
greater liability than the drafters of the Restatement intended and
would defeat the justification for imposing strict liability. These commentators argue that the purpose of strict liability is to regulate marketplace behavior based on the notion that a defendant is making an
informed choice and accordingly justification for strict liability would
only be satisfied if a defendant were held liable only for foreseeable
risks. Others have countered that the imposition of a knowledge or
foreseeability requirement defeats the policies on which strict liability
is based and becomes too much like a negligence claim." Some
commentators believe that strict liability is imposed solely to protect
the public and that a defendant should not be excused from liability
simply because he was unaware of the extent of the risks posed by
his activity. These individuals believe that allowing evidence of foreseeability would undercut the public protection policy of strict liability.
This issue becomes far more complicated by the timing problem
presented in this case. Should the court decide to include the knowledge/foreseeability element, it must also choose a point in time from
which to assess this characteristic. Possible choices might be: the
knowledge at the time of trial, the knowledge available at the time
the property was sold, or the knowledge available at the time the
defendant engaged in the activity. Courts in products liability cases
with timing problems have generally"5 used either the time of trial
rule86 or the time of the activity rule. 7 Professor Wade, in his

84. See James L Zazzali & Frank P. Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights & Remedies? The Report of the Superfund Study Group, 13 SETON HALL L. REv. 446, 462 (1983).

This argument is that the liability is imposed due to the danger of the activity and not for
the defendant's fault; therefore knowledge is irrelevant, and to include it would violate the
policy of liability without excuse.
85. See Wade, supra note 5, at 754.
86. The time of trial rule would mean evaluating the knowledge of the risks posed by
radium as they are known at the trial date. A similar rule is employed in the medical
malpractice area in the time of discovery rule, which allows plaintiff to toll the statute of
limitations until such time as the injury allegedly caused by the doctor is discovered or
should have been discovered. See generally McEntire v. Malloy, 707 S.W.2d 773 (Ark.
1986); Werner v. American-Edwards Lab., 745 P.2d 1055 (Idaho 1987); Bonney v. Upjohn

Co., 342 N.W.2d 551 (Mich. CL App. 1983). The time of discovery rule is temporally close
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treatise on torts, argues that the time of trial rule simplifies the trial
process and may increase safety precautions, but may also discourage
useful activity or encourage withholding newly acquired information
to avoid litigation.8 8 On the other hand, he argues that using the
knowledge at the time of the act (time of activity rule) precludes
strict liability from becoming absolute liability by making sure that
the defendant is not held liable for unknowable risks. 9 The time of
activity would seem to be the proper perspective to use because it
delves into the knowledge of the particular defendant and it also
eliminates the problem of broadening liability too far, which would be
the effect of using the time of trial rule because the court has the
privilege of much more information and foresight than the defendant
had. Further, if the court wants the knowledge element to have real
substantive meaning, it should only charge the defendant for risks
which were scientifically knowable at the time it chose to engage in
the activity.
Other problems are associated with the implication of knowledge
element into a case with a timing problem. Because of the long time
gap, it will be more difficult for the court to ascertain exactly how
much of the danger was known or knowable at the time the defendant chose to engage in the activity (assuming the court would evaluate according to the knowledge at the time of the activity). The timing problem increases the possibility that the defendant will actually
be held liable for unknowable risks because much of the exposure to
the substance is not taking place at the time of the activity but years
in the future. In an abnormally dangerous activity case without the
timing problem, the defendant is only liable for the present risks of
his activity. When this twist is added, a defendant may be responsible
for future risks as well. If the court chooses not to include the

to the time of trial rule and it is the same in that it evaluates some aspect of the trial not at
the time when the alleged act occurred but at some fixed later date.
87. The time of activity rule allows the court to look at precisely what knowledge
existed or was foreseeable at the time when the defendant was actually engaged in the
activity. This rule seems to be more appropriate because it looks to the knowledge of the
defendant, which is what is really relevant in this case.
Another example of use of the time of activity rule is in medical malpractice cases:
the doctor's fault is determined as of the time of the alleged malpractice. Grindstaff v.
Coleman, 681 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1982) (applying the standard of care existing at the time
of birth to determine obstetrician's negligence); Goodman v. Lipman, 399 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1990) (following requisite standard of care at the time of the alleged malpractice).
88. See Wade, supra note 5, at 754.
89. Id. at 756.
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knowledge element, the defendant's activity must be safe,' not only
according to the contemporaneous scientific standards at the time of
the activity, but it must remain safe even as the definition of what is
safe changes over the decades. Adding this element as a requirement
in an abnormally dangerous activity case serves a fairness purpose
because it absolves a defendant of liability when the dangers and
risks of his activity are unknowable. 9'
If the court decides not to include a knowledge component in
abnormally dangerous activity cases, such cases would be greatly
simplified because no expert testimony' would be needed about the
state of scientific knowledge at the time of the activity. Also, absent
the element, it is easier to prove that the party who created the hazard should be held responsible, and therefore a completely innocent
party will not be left holding the cleanup bill.93 Defendants will be
put on notice that they should be extremely careful when engaging in
an activity that may be abnormally dangerous because they could be
exposing themselves or their successor corporations to liability for an
indefinite period of time. Putting industry on notice could be beneficial if it encourages safety precautions and thorough scientific investigation of the potential risks of the activity prior to engaging in it.
On the other hand, companies might well decide that the risk of
liability from what is scientifically unknowable at present but might
be learned in the future is simply too great a risk to take. If that
happens, potentially beneficial activities might not develop, and present activities involving certain risks as well as benefits might also
94
cease.

90. What is meant by "safe" in the context of this discussion is not that the activity be
without any risk, rather, the term is used here as the opposite of abnormally dangerous (i.e.,
benefits of the safe activity outweigh the risks while the risks of an abnormally dangerous
activity outweigh the benefits).
91. The converse argument is that the defendant's liability should not be determined by
when the risks were known to the defendant but simply by when the risks actually occurred.
92. Expert testimony not only complicates the trial by increasing the complexity of the
issues for the jury to decide, it lengthens the trial and also greatly increases the cost of
litigation.
93. This is a serious problem in toxic torts cases because under Superfund, the federal
government cleans up hazardous sites and then looks to be reimbursed for the cleanup costs.
Often, as in this case, the current owner is the party to whom the government hands the bill.
94. A similar policy argument has been made in opposing the adoption of market share
liability in DES cases. Deleting a knowledge element in strict liability cases might discourage
manufacturing or storage of dangerous materials. These activities might be necessary and
beneficial but companies may not engage in them if they are too unsure of what the future
risks might be. Similarly, deleting the causation requirement under a market share theory
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Another alternative available to the New Jersey Supreme Court
would be to include the knowledge element and impute it to the
defendant, but allow the defendant the opportunity to rebut the
knowledge presumption.95 If this approach is used, the plaintiff will
be spared the burden of introducing evidence of scientific knowledge
or foreseeability. The defendant will have the burden of proving the
"state of the art" of knowledge as it existed at the time he engaged
in the activity. The "state of the art" defense would allow the defendant to present evidence in an attempt to prove that at the time he
engaged in the activity, he did not know and could not be expected
to foresee the danger inherent in carrying out this activity. If the
defendant presents sufficient evidence to show that the "state of the
art" was such that he could not know or foresee the risks of his
activity, then the defendant would not be held liable. The defendant's
argument would be that it could not have known the nature and extent of the health risk and therefore should not be held liable for
risks which could not be weighed and evaluated at the time of the
activity.96 In terms of fairness, this is the optimal solution because
the defendant should have better access to this information, and companies might be encouraged to keep detailed records on the state of
the art to rely on in case litigation were to arise. Also, the chilling
effect on industry would not be as great in instances where new but
useful activities are being considered, because so long as sufficient
research is done on the risks, companies will only be strictly liable
for foreseeable dangers.

could have a -deleterious effect on the development and marketing of new drugs." Payton v.
Abbott Lab., 437 N.E.2d 171, 190 (Mass. 1982). See generally KEETON ET AL, supra note
15, at 697-702.
95. This approach has been used in strict products liability cases for failure to warn.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991); Bernier v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 516 A.2d 534 (Me. 1986); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374
(NJ. 1984). See generally KEETON ET AL, supra note 15, at 697-702.
96. Although the court in T&E H rejected the theory of cost-benefit analysis, this theory
is viable here. The principle of cost-benefit analysis is that the defendant weighs the potential
costs or liability from his activity against the benefits to society plus the profit he will make.
According to this theory, the defendant will not engage in the activity unless the benefits
exceed ihe costs. Unless the court allows the defendant to introduce evidence of knowledge,
he will be held liable for costs he could not have contemplated in making his decision and

this theory loses its value and predictability. If knowledge can be introduced, the model still
works because the costs are limited by what is scientifically knowable. See generally James
A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 765 (1983) (detailing the problems involved in costbenefit analysis when dealing with strict products liability cases with a timing problem).
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While the knowledge element and the timing problem have never
been brought together in an abnormally dangerous activity case, there
is a wealth of commentary on how the timing problem affects products liability cases (particularly design defect and failure to warn).'
These commentaries reveal similar problems in the products area in
deciding whether knowledge has a place in a strict liability cause of
action, as well as how this decision is complicated by the passage of
time.98 Some courts have chosen to include the knowledge element
in products cases, citing that a failure to do so "would make a manufacturer a virtual insurer of its product's safe use, a result that is not
consonant with established principles underlying strict liability.""
Other courts chose to exclude it because "[it] has no bearing on the
outcome of a strict liability claim; the sole subject of inquiry is the
defective condition of the product and not the manufacturer's
knowledge, negligence or fault."'0 Particularly relevant to this discussion are products cases involving asbestos"0 ' and prescription
drugs, 2 because the timing gap 1°3 in these cases is fairly lengthy.
Most courts in asbestos cases allow evidence that the manufacturer
knew or should have known of the risks posed by the substance
before strict liability will be imposed."° Knowledge has also been
considered and state of the art evidence permitted in drug cases.1 5
It is difficult to predict whether the New Jersey Supreme Court
would have included knowledge or foreseeability as an element in an
abnormally dangerous activity case, in light of its precedent. In

97. See, e.g., Wade, supra note 5.
98. See generally id. supra note 5, (providing a good analysis of the interplay between
knowledge and the timing problem in products liability cases).
99. Anderson, 810 P.2d at 550; see also Thibault v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d
843, 847 (N.H. 1978) (plaintiff must show causation and foreseeability for strict liability to
be imposed because the manufacturer is only required to warn of foreseeable dangers).
100. Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984).
101. Anderson, 810 P.2d 549; Bernier v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 516 A.2d 534 (Me. 1986);
Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466 (NJ. 1986); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (NJ. 1982).
102. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986); Feldman v.
Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374 (NJ. 1984); Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 551
A.2d 177 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1988).
103. In the drug and asbestos cases there is a time gap between the time when the
plaintiff was exposed to the product and when the corresponding injury occurred. These cases
are analogous to the T&E 11 case because in T&E H there is a similar time gap between the
time when the public was exposed to the risks posed by radium and the corresponding injury
suffered by plaintiff.
104. See sources cited in Bernier, 516 A.2d at 539.
105. Feldman, 479 A.2d at 386.
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Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,"6 the court held that in
a strict liability case for failure to warn, "there should be strict liability without reference to what excuse defendant might give for being
unaware of the danger." 1°7 The case goes on to comment that state
of the art is a negligence defense, not a strict liability defense. The
court also rejected the defendant's policy argument that it could not
perform an accurate cost-benefit analysis" 8 if it could be sued for
unknowable risks."° The Feldman court took a different approach,
imputing knowledge to the defendant on a strict liability claim that
Declomycin had damaged plaintiff's teeth. 1 Moreover, the court
stated that defendants in design defect and failure to warn cases could
introduce evidence of the state of the art in order to rebut the presumption of knowledge. 1 Thus, the holding of Feldman comes to
a different conclusion than Beshada and the court synthesized the two
by holding that the Beshada decision is limited to its facts (i.e. asbestos cases).112 In Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., another asbestos case, the court reiterated that the state of the art defense was not
available in such a case. The court went on to state that "the overriding goal of strict products liability is to protect customers and promote product safety [and] manufacturers are made responsible for
injuries caused." 1 What is obvious from these decision is that the
Supreme Court of New Jersey is willing to interpret the law differently depending on the product and the risks that such product presents
to the public. What is not clear from its precedent is whether the
court would include a knowledge/foreseeability component in abnormally dangerous activity cases.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The decision as to whether the Restatement section 520 factors
will be evaluated from the time of trial perspective or the time of the
activity perspective is one which is vital to the future of abnormally

106.

447 A.2d 539 (NJ. 1982).

107. Id. at 546.
108. See supra note 96 (discussing the theory of cost-benefit analysis).
109. The court in T&E II also rejected the use of cost-benefit analysis. See supra note
96.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 385-87 (NJ. 1984).
Id.
Id. at 388.
512 A.2d 466 (NJ. 1986).
Id. at 546.
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dangerous activity cases. The court should utilize the time of the
activity perspective because the Restatement section 520 focuses on
the defendant's actiity and his decision to engage in such activity, as
balanced against the situational factors existing at the time such decision was made. The time of trial rule is inconsistent with the
Restatement's accent on the activity. Using the time of trial rule
would impose more stringent requirements on defendants who engage
in activities with long-term risks than on those whose activities involve short-term risks, because this approach shifts the focus away
from the activity and onto the harm (Factors A & B). Factors C
through F cannot be effective guidelines if they are applied at some
unknown future date, because the amount of foresight required would
be so extensive as to render them completely useless to a defendant
deciding whether or not to engage in an activity. Since the Restatement factors are meant to be used by potential defendants as well as
courts, the time of activity rule should be used to ensure that each
entity is measuring the risks and benefits of the given activity according to the same standards.
The second principal issue raised by this case is whether knowledge or foreseeability will be included by the New Jersey Supreme
Court as an element in forthcoming abnormally dangerous activity
cases with a timing problem. Clearly, there are strong policy arguments to be made for both including and excluding the knowledge
element. The strongest argument for inclusion is fairness to the defendant. Strict liability becomes absolute liability if industries are held
liable for creating risks which were scientifically unknowable at the
time of the activity. The defendant will be held liable even though
there may have been no feasible way to make its activity safer at that
time. There also may have been insufficient information for defendant
to know the danger to which he was exposing the community or the
liability to which he was exposing himself.'
The arguments for excluding the knowledge element are equally
compelling. Excluding knowledge as an element dramatically simplifies the case by eliminating the need for evidence as to what knowledge existed at the relevant points in time, thereby reducing both the
length and cost of future trials. Also, industries that pollute or endanger society stand a greater chance of being held liable absent a foreseeability requirement. Correspondingly, an innocent subsequent purchaser of the defendant's land is less likely to be left with cleanup
costs under Superfund or a similar state statute. Society as a whole
will benefit from the cleaner and safer environment presented by the
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restored property. In addition, society enjoys the benefit of bringing
the polluter to justice, rather than sacrificing the tax dollars of the
innocent majority. Finally, excluding the knowledge element eliminates many new issues and problems which would result should the
element be included.
The best alternative is a compromise between the two previously
discussed views. The court should resolve this issue by imputing the
knowledge element to the defendant but allowing the defendant the
opportunity to present evidence rebutting the presumption of knowledge. This is the optimal alternative because it places a heavy burden
on industry to prove that it could not have known of the risks of its
activity and yet if those risks were genuinely unknowable, a defendant has the opportunity to absolve itself of liability by presenting
adequate proof of that fact. In addition, the defendant who engaged in
the activity will have more access to information on knowledge existing at the time of the activity than an innocent plaintiff who probably
knew little or nothing about such activity until the time of the lawsuit. Thus, this approach is more equitable because the party with
greater access to the information, who may have created a hazardous
condition, is the one who must come forward and prove the lack of
this element. This approach also balances the policy considerations of
the two aforementioned alternatives. If defendant cannot show a lack
of knowledge of the risks posed by its activity at the time it chose to
engage in such activity, it will be strictly liable for all resulting injuries. In this instance, society and the subsequent landowner will be
compensated by the party who engaged in the activity and who cannot prove that the risks posed by its activity were beyond its comprehension. On the other hand, if a defendant can show that the risks
posed by its activity were unknowable, they will not be strictly liable
and the policy interest of fairness to the defendant is fulfilled. Since
the burden on the defendant is so great, the majority of defendants
will probably be held liable and thus the vital interest in the environment will be preserved in most cases. Only in cases where the defendant shared a lack of knowledge about the risks of the activity with
the remainder of the population will the interest in fairness to the
defendant prevail and the cleanup costs be distributed in a different
manner. Defendant, in this second instance, is not forced to bear
alone the price of its ignorance to the exclusion of the remainder of
society. This solution balances the fairness and policy arguments, all
of which are meritorious, raised by the previously mentioned options.
The T&E II decision is quite obviously a landmark one. The
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New Jersey Supreme Court expanded the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to encompass a distant predecessor in title. This holding
will certainly benefit the environmental movement, as well as those
individuals seeking to have their land restored to a safe condition. For
defendants, however, the decision created more questions than it answered. Is knowledge or lack of scientific knowability a factor in the
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine, or is the state of the art defense available? If knowledge is a factor, from what point in time is
it evaluated? What policy considerations are paramount? From what
perspective do we evaluate the section 520 factors, when there is a
timing problem involved? How will the T&E II case and its rationale
affect future abnormally dangerous activity cases? What is the legacy
that T&E H and its successor cases will leave behind? What the answers will be to these questions, only time will tell." 5
Christine M. Beggs*

115. No cases subsequent to T&E H have answered any of these questions. However,
T&E H has been cited as precedent by New Jersey courts for some of the other principles
stated therein. See Russell-Stanley Corp. v. Plant Indus., Inc., 595 A.2d 534 (NJ. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1991) (explaining that one must consider Restatement § 520 factors in ascertaining
whether defendant's activity is abnormally dangerous; the holding in T&E II is not specific to
toxic dumping; caveat emptor is not a defense to successor liability for abnormally dangerous

activity).
Note that a district court in Florida rejected T&E H's argument that caveat emptor no
longer is a defense in commercial purchases when an abnormally dangerous activity claim is
raised. Rather, the court held that caveat emptor still applies because the purchaser can
protect itself through contract or inspection and so the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine
should not be extended to subsequent purchasers. See Futura Realty v. Lone Star Bldg. Ctr.,
578 So. 2d 363, 365 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1991).
* I wish to thank Professor Vein Walker of the Hofstra University School of Law for
his encouragement and support in the preparation of this Comment.
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